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The F'ragmented Island: 
Ethnic Conflict and the Politics of Culture in Sri Lanka 
Sujata Ramachandran 
This article examines the role of culture 
in the ethnic conflict and strife in Sri 
hh. The general aim is to achieve an 
understanding of the nationalist process, 
the force of nationalist ideas and tradi- 
tions in motivating action-action that is 
often violent and intolerant-and to 
demonstrate the value of a cultural ap- 
proach to the understanding of modem 
societies. Culture has been examined in 
two ways here, namely, the dramaturgic 
approach to culture which emphasizes 
the expressive dimensions of culture, 
and the politics of culture or the political 
culture approach, whereby cultural 
manifestations are utilized effectively to 
maintain power between groups. The 
article concludes that the Sinhalese- 
Tamil conflict is a product of modem 
politics, and culture has been used effec- 
tively to legitimate rival nationalisms in 
Sri Lanka. 
Introduction 
For nearly a decade, the island of Sri 
Lanka hasbeen involved in the" continu- 
ing hemorrhage of a Lebanon-or-Ul- 
ster-style internecine civil war" (Wilson 
1982,295), where the Sinhalese majority 
and the Tamil minority are in violent 
conflict. This opposition is often por- 
trayed as a product of ancient history or 
the outcome of animosity that has alleg- 
edly existed unchanged for centuries. 
The majority has turned to the elements 
of culture and cultural symbols, includ- 
ing religion, language and the historical 
past, to justify their actions of subordi- 
nating the minority. The Tamils eventu- 
ally retaliated by engaging in a armed 
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revolutionary struggle for Tamil na- 
tionalliberation, demanding the creation 
of a separate state of Tamil Eelam. 
The role of culture and its effective- 
ness in legitimizing the rival national- 
isms in Sri Lanka remains largely 
unacknowledged. This article attempts 
to examine the function or the politics of 
culture in this ethnic conflict pertaining 
to the generation of opposing ethnic 
identities, the role of the historical past, 
political myths and elite1 interest groups 
in symbolic construction, and the mean- 
ings these provide for the groups inques- 
tion. 
The Culture of Nationalism and the 
Politics of Culture 
To inquire into the truth of the political 
myths is, therefore as meaningless and 
ridiculous as to ask for the truth of the 
machine gun or a fighter plane. Both 
are weapons and weapons prove their 
truth by their efficiency. If political 
myths could stand this test they need 
no other or better proof. In this respect, 
the theory was beyond attack and in- 
vulnerable. All it had to do was to put 
the political myths into action and to 
show their constructive and destruc- 
tive power. 
- Emst Cassirer, "Judaism and 
Modem Political Myths" 
Culture has assumed a place of pride in 
the litany of nationalisms everywhere. 
Almost universally the culture that na- 
tionalists worship include the founding 
myths, legends, customs, traditions and 
language of the nation. These are at once 
constituted within the nation and consti- 
tute the nation. They are integral to na- 
tional sovereignty and are made sacred 
in the nation as the nation is made sacred 
in them. Culture in nationalism becomes 
an object, a reified thing, something that 
can be separated or abstracted from the 
flow of social life. Made into a religious 
object, culture becomes the focus of de- 
votion. It can have the character of a reli- 
gious fetish, an idol, a thing that has self- 
contained magical properties (Kapferer 
1988,4). 
Culture in nationalism becomes the 
focus of this article and is seen in a par- 
ticular way here. The dramaturgic ap- 
proach has been adopted relating to the 
expressive or communicative properties 
of culture(Wuthnow l987,13). Cultureis 
identifiable as the symbolic-expressive 
dimension of social culture and social 
relations that communicates informa- 
tion about morally binding obligations 
and is, in tum, influenced by the struc- 
ture of these obligations. Culture, in this 
approach, consists of utterances, acts, ob- 
jects and events-all of which are ob- 
servable. What is significant is the 
capacity of the various elements of cul- 
ture, including rituals, ideologies and 
other symbolic acts, to dramatize the na- 
ture of social relations. Symbolic acts are 
likely to be meaningful if they articulate 
the nature of social relations. 
Political culture "consists of the sys- 
tem of empirical beliefs, expressive sym- 
bols, and values which defines the 
situation in which political action takes 
place" (Pye and Verba 1965, 9). In this 
article, I refer to the importance of poli- 
tics as an independent variable shaping 
ethnicity, one that pits ethnic entities 
against one another and offers ethnic en- 
trepreneurs high incentive for the cul- 
tural mobilization of their groups. 
Ethnicity has been highly politicized in 
Sri Lanka, and cultural mobilization is 
used effectively in the competitive pur- 
suit of wealth, status or power. Political 
culture refers not to what is happening in 
the world of politics and society per se, 
but what peoplebelieveabout these hap- 
penings. And these beliefs can be of sev- 
eral kinds: they can be empirical beliefs 
about the actual state of political and so- 
cial life; they can be beliefs as to the goals 
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and values that ought to be pursued; and 
they may have an important expressive 
and emotional dimension. People re- 
spond to what they perceive of politics 
and its use of culture and they interpret 
what they see. From the cultural point of 
view, for instance, we would look at 
these events in the political history of Sri 
Lanka, not so much as a series of objec- 
tive events but as a series of events that 
may be interpreted quite differently by 
different people, and whose effects on 
future events depend on their interpreta- 
tions. The terms, "meaning" and "inter- 
pretation", here, are relational terns. 
They refer to the interaction between 
what exists in the mind of the individual 
or collectivity and to what happens in the 
outside world. 
Ethnic conflict is, therefore, related 
primarily and sometimes solely to the 
problems of social organization that are 
conceived in terms of politics and the 
allocation of scarce resources. More spe- 
cifically, ethniaty is said to be inherently 
related to competition and conflict. Eth- 
nic actions are actions in which a claim to 
common provenance (or origin), ances- 
try or culture are potent (Shlomo 1974, 
281-84). In the case of Sri Lanka, ethnic- 
cultural symbols are activated or ma- 
nipulated in the framework of political 
conflict. 
Who Is a Tamil? Who Is a Sinhalese? 
The Question of Collective Identity 
All nice people like Us, are We, 
And everybody else is They. 
- Rudyard Kipling 
The emergent nationalities in Sri Lanka 
indicate the tendency of individuals to 
identify with particular collectives or eth- 
nic groups such as Tamils or Sinhalese. 
This is based on the principle of inclusion 
or exclusion (Breton 1988, 1992). These 
include the conditions for becoming or 
ceasing to be a member; and the circum- 
stances under which one can be expelled 
(Breton 1992,4). Identity is a subjective, 
individual phenomenon; it is shaped 
through the constantly recurring ques- 
tion, "Who am I?" with the inevitable 
corollary, "Who is he?" or "Who is she?" 
Generalized to the collectivity, these be- 
come, "Who are we?" and "Who are 
they?" These questions involve the basic 
processes of cognition, perception and 
symbol formation. This identity can be 
an individual phenomena, but is also 
applicable within the social grouping to 
which the individual belongs. Indeed, 
identity "is a process located in the core 
of the individual and yet also in the core 
of his communalculture: a process which 
establishes, in fact, the identity of these 
two identities" (Young 1976,20). 
The basis of these solidarity group 
ings are commonalities or affinities of 
ethniaty, language, race, caste, assumed 
blood tie, custom andlor territory 
(Young 1976,12). The main formal crite- 
rion of membership of the rival Sinhalese 
and Tamil collectivities today appear to 
be linguistic, religious and historical an- 
tecedents. Although four different 
ethno-religious-linguistic collectivities 
reside in Sri Lanka, more than 92 percent 
of the inhabitants idenhfy themselves 
with one of the two distinct groups, 
Sinhalese and Tamil. In 1981, the esti- 
mated population of the island was 14.85 
million, of which the Sinhalese andTamil 
communities account for 74 and 18.2 per- 
cent, respectively. The Tamils them- 
selves have been divided into Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Indian Tamils which form 
12.6 and 5.5 percent of the total popula- 
tion, respectively. The other group, i.e., 
the Muslims (Moors) form 7.1 percent of 
the total population. The last three cat- 
egories are all speakers of Tamil, but are 
differentiated by religion and/or puta- 
tive origin. Indigenous Sri Lankan 
(Ceylon) Tamils are settled in the north 
and the east; Indian Tamils are the de- 
scendants of estate workers brought in 
from South India during the British pe- 
riod (Spencer 1990, 14). [Also see 
Manogaran in this issue ] 
Of importance in the long run is how 
the political identities of the Sinhalese 
and Tamils came into being, how these 
groups came to represent the differences 
themselves, and how these ideas were 
used. Today these ideas about "Sinhala- 
ness" centre around four themes: 
The Sinhalese share a certain biologi- 
cal nature; that they are a race. The 
unity of the Sinhalese is asserted over 
and above Low Country1 Up Coun- 
try or caste differences. Indeed, the 
1981 census was the first to treat 
Sinhala as a unity. Although re- 
spondents had been classified in 
separate Up Country and Low 
Country categories by the enumera- 
tors, this division was not main- 
tained in the published records. 
Interestingly, no such unification of 
the Tamil population was effected in 
this census. 
One manifestation of this biological 
community is the sharing of a com- 
mon language. 
"True Sinhalese" also share a com- 
mon religion: i.e., they areBuddhists. 
Sri Lanka is in its entirety the land of 
Sinhala and of Buddhism: it is the 
Sinhalese-Buddhist nation. The peo- 
ple, language, religion, culture and 
territory are all intimately linked. 
These ideas are paralleled among the 
Tamil community (Nissan and Stirrat 
1990,30). 
The groups involved here are not 
necessarily permanent, frozen 
collectivities, but are in a state of flux in 
response to long-term forces of social 
change and shorter-term alterations in 
political context. For example, the 
Sinhalese themselves were a divided 
group not long ago and the development 
of a common Sinhalese identity took 
time. In the 1920~~  there was still a sizable 
number of Kandyan Sinhalese who de- 
manded separate representation from 
Low-Country Sinhalese and who also 
favoured a federal system of government 
(Nissan and Stirrat 1990,45). Similarly, 
the Tamils themselves were divided into 
the SriLankan Tamils and IndianTamils, 
as described earlier. But Tamil and 
Sinhalese nationalisms today tend to 
overlook these differences. 
The main criterion of membership of 
the rival Sinhalese and Tamil communi- 
ties today is linguistic, but in the colonial 
period the most salient identities-at 
least as far as riots and disturbances were 
concerned-were religious. Catholics, 
who were pitted against the Buddhists 
and Hindus in colonial conflicts, are now 
divided into Sinhalese Catholics and 
Tamil Catholics. Yet Muslims, who are 
predominantly Tamil-speaking and as 
-- - - 
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such might to be thought to have suf- 
fered as much as anyone from linguistic 
discrimination since 1956, have stub- 
bornly maintained their ethnic separate- 
ness from their fellow Tamil speakers 
and have pursued their own political 
course in recent years while remaining 
aloof until very recently from the central 
ethnic conflict. In fact, the particular as- 
sembly of "races" identifiedin the census 
of Sri Lanka, based on the mklange of 
religious, linguistic and geographical ai- 
teria, can only be explained through a 
detailed account of the politics of identity 
(Spencer 1990,8). 
The Power of the Past 
The use of history is no longer inciden- 
tal with interesting snippets being 
taken to bolster an argument, but it is 
fashioned and streamlined to serve a 
purpose, and contradictory details are 
blacked out. - Anon 
Sinhalese and Tamil communities in Sri 
Lanka tend to view their relationships in 
terms of histories that stretch back for at 
least 2,500 years. These histories buttress 
the opposing territorial claims of the two 
communities and make the conflict be- 
tween them seem inevitable. For the 
Sinhalese, history justifies their claim to 
impose their rule all over Sri Lanka. For 
Tamils, too, history is used to justlfy d e  
mands, in the past for a degree of au- 
tonomy in Tamil-dominated areas, and 
today for total separation from the 
Sinhalese-dominated parts of the coun- 
try (Nissan and Stirrat 1990,19). Histori- 
cal myths and legends are recreated to 
reinforce the idea. Just as the Sinhalese 
Buddhist ethnic majority seeks to review 
the past in modem garments, so the 
Tamil minority in its turn has begun to 
takerefuge in the fact that inCeylon there 
was once a separate Tamil kingdom 
(Wilson 1988,22). 
The Sinhalese people claim that even 
if they were not the first inhabitants of the 
island, a status they allow to the "prirni- 
tive Veddas," they were at least the first 
"civilized" settlers of Sri Lanka (Nissan 
and Stirrat 1990). They claim to be de- 
scended from north Indian Aryan ances- 
tors who spoke an Indo-European 
language that developei into Sinhala. 
Prince Vijaya, the mythical ancestor of 
the Sinhalese people, and his followers 
are said to have arrived on the shores of 
Lanka on the day of Buddha's death; but 
even before Vijaya's arrival, Lanka 
claims to have had a close relationship 
with the Buddha. According to the is- 
land's ancient chronicle histories, the 
Buddha visited the island on several oc- 
casions and announced that in Lanka his 
"doctrine should ... shine in glory" 
(Nissan and Stirrat 1990,20). However, 
the Sinhalese were only converted to 
Buddhism in the third century B.C. by 
Mahinda, son of the great Indian em- 
peror, Ashoka, during the reign of King 
Devanarnpiyatissa. Since then, so it is 
claimed, they have with few exceptions 
always been Buddhist. During the 
Anuradhapura period (circa third cen- 
tury B.C. to ninth century A.D.), a great 
Buddhist civilization flourished in Sri 
Lanka. This state was continually under 
habitants of &,anka were really Tamil; 
that the Sinhabese were originally Tamil 
who converted to Buddhism and 
adopted Sinhala, a language based on 
Pali, the language of Buddhist texts; and 
much of what the Sinhalese uphold as 
monuments of their past greatness was 
actually produced by Tamil ancestry. 
The historical arguments are numer- 
ous, but as it is the Sinhalese who are 
politically and numerically dominant in 
the island, so it is Sinhalese history, to a 
great extent, that sets the terms of the 
debate. Despite the fact that these two 
histories are opposing versions of the 
past, each stressing the claims of the com- 
munity that generatesit, they share many 
features in common. Both present the 
past in terms of the interaction of two 
opposed entities, the Sinhalese and 
Tamils, who have always been as sepa- 
rate as they are today. Secondly, they 
Despite the fact that these two histories are opposing versions of 
the past, each stressing the claims of the community that 
generates it, they share muny features in common. 
pressure from the South Indian kings; 
one in particular, Elara, ruled 
Anuradhapura for over forty years in the 
second century B.C. until he was de- 
feated by the heroic Sinhalese-Buddhist 
king, Dutugamunu. Eventually, the 
Sinhalese were forced to retreat south- 
wards, first toPolonnaruwa, then tovari- 
ous other capitals until the last phase of 
Sinhalese independence, which centred 
on Kandy. The Kandyan kingdom was 
eventually ceded to the British in 1815. 
The Sinhalese claim is that these Tamil 
communities never, or only rarely, 
formed separate political entities. Rather, 
once settled in Lanka they accepted the 
suzerainty of the Sinhalese kings (Nissan 
and Stirrat 1990,20). 
Not surprisingly, the Tamil version 
of the past is somewhat different (Nissan 
and Stirrat 1990). In its "soft" version, it is 
argued, Tamils have lived in Sri Lanka 
for at least 2,000 years (from the Elara 
period) and formed their own autono- 
mous political units independent of 
Sinhalese control. Satchi Ponnambalam, 
for example, claims that the original in- 
consist of arguments over events that 
allegedly occurred between the fourth 
century B.C. and the tenth century A.D. 
Thirdly, they present the two comrnuni- 
ties as historically and continuously op- 
posed through warfare, joining an 
ancient past to the present withno regard 
for the hiatus of centuries. Fourthly, the 
histories are both concerned with a "na- 
tional people's" claim to its own terri- 
tory. Finally, each side presents the other 
as little more than barbarians (Nissan 
and Stirrat 1990). Both sides in the 
present political context back up their 
respective claims through the selective 
and competitive use of archaeological 
evidence. Factions on each side have 
been willing to destroy or reinterpret 
evidence that would support the other 
party. Differing maps are produced that 
purport to show the distribution of 
Sinhalese and Tamils in Lanka in the 
past, In this context S.J. Tambiah writes: 
Although the major identity compo- 
nent of the Sinhalese are their Sinhalese 
language and Buddhist religion, and 
of the Tamils, their Hindu religion, 
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both these populations share many 
parallel features of traditional caste, 
kinship, popular religious cult, cus- 
toms and so on. But they have come to 
be dividedby their mythic charter sand 
tendentious historical understanding 
of their past (Tambiah 1986,5). 
Another aspect that has been conven- 
iently werlwked is that the Tamil and 
Sinhalese identities are largely created 
since "it seems that neither the Sinhalese 
nor the Tamils have remained racially 
pure" @e Silva et al. 198& 13), and that 
intennixing has taken place, as revealed 
by the following statement: 
Aside from its plethora of faiths, Sri 
Lanka is also a country of racial diver- 
sity revealed in the frequency of eyes 
coloured from brown to blue, crinkly 
and smooth hair, flat and hooked 
noses. Proof enough that no racial 
stockhasescapedmixturtwith several 
others (Ram 1989,31). 
Power Relations and Symbolic 
Action: The Role of '6Political 
Myths" 
But meanings and symbols are not de- 
pendent on things as context; they are 
relations, not objects. Ignoring this 
point, seeing meanings and symbols 
as things, has allowed cultural ana- 
lysts to erect a distinction between 
symbolic structures and concrete 
structures; to differentiate religion, 
myth, art-held to be "essentially" 
symbolic forms-from economics, 
politics, kinship, or everyday living. 
This is a position we reject. 
- Dolgin et al. quoted in Gusfield 
and Michalowia 1984. 
The myth, an unquestioned belief held in 
common by a large group of people that 
gives events and actions a particular 
meaning, is a particularly relevant form 
of symbol in the emergence of mass po- 
litical movements. When we recognize 
the functions it serves for the group and 
its individual adherents, we can define 
the systematic ties between individual 
role attachment and common adherence 
to a controversial political movement 
(Edelman 1971,53). 
While myths or symbols exist in their 
own right and are observed for their in- 
trinsic values, they are nearly always 
manipulated, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, in the struggle for and the main- 
tenance of power between individuals 
and groups. Political myths or symbols 
have distinctivecharacteristicsthat make 
them dynamically different from other 
perceptions. They develop and are mu- 
tually reinforced by large collectivities of 
people, evoking intense hopes and fears, 
threats and reassurances (Edelman 1971, 
2). In other words, myths and symbols 
are objects, acts, concepts or linguistic 
formations that stand ambiguously for a 
multiplicity of disparate meanings, 
evoke sentiments and emotions, and 
impel men to action (Cohen 1974, ix). 
In the following discussion of sym- 
bolic forms, a distinction is thus made 
between the kinds of meanings. The de- 
notation of symbolismis that it stands for 
something else, but the meanings de- 
rived from these symbols are not the 
same-they provide different meanings 
to different individuals or groups. 
First, collectives generally have a 
"myth of origin" that entails the recon- 
struction of the past and/or creation of a 
myhcal past. It includes views about 
the present's continuity or rupture with 
the past, as well as the expectations and/ 
or desiderata for the future (Breton 1992, 
6). Two significant dimensionsof the past 
include the symbolically constructed 
past in which the past is the overflow of 
the present. It is oriented from the 
present. It is akin on one side to our es- 
cape fancies, those in which we rebuild 
the world according to our heart's de- 
sires, and on the other to the selection of 
what is significant that must be held or 
reconstructed. Its decisive character 
pushes back conditioning continuities of 
the present (Maines et al. 1983,163). The 
other dimension includes the "mythical 
past," which refers solely to symbolic 
creations that are used to manipulate 
social relationships. These pasts are crea- 
tions rather than re-creations because 
they are not empirically grounded. They 
are fictitious. However, they are empiri- 
cal in their consequences because they 
can materially affect relationships 
(Maines et al. 1983,164). In Sri Lanka, the 
myths of origin form the complex of the 
above and can be conceived as purpose- 
ful creations which control and shape 
collective behaviour. They provide a 
manipulative dimension to social rela- 
tions because they are created precisely 
for establishing and maintaining advan- 
tage. Cohen terms this "cultural exten- 
sion," in which myth refers to some prior 
point in the society's history, the rooting 
of the present in the past and in so doing 
legitimizing the present by investing it 
with the values that have become sacred 
by their very historical or traditional 
nature. 
The point has been made succinctly 
by Worsley, "Men ransack the past to 
find legitimations for the present: they 
discover precursors, trace intellectual 
pedigrees, rewrite history" (Cohen 1975, 
15). 
The great myth of origin of the 
Sinhalese people, as given in the reli- 
gious chronicles, especially the 
Mahavamsa, of the foundation of their 
state and of the triumphant reconquest 
by a Sinhalese Buddhist king of Sri 
Lanka, creates a divinely sanctioned so- 
cial order in which Sri Lanka becomes 
the land of the Sinhalese Buddhists and 
which legitimizes the right of the 
Sinhalese majority to subordinate the 
Tamil minority. The Buddhism of 
Sinhalese nationalism is one of national- 
ist practice and interpretation, a Bud- 
dhism reconstituted in the religion of 
nationalism. It creates the vision of a 
myth of symbiotic social order in 
which Tamils have a subordinate role 
and Sinhalese-Buddhists a super- 
ordinate one based on the divinely 
ordained order. It validates the domi- 
nant status of the Sinhalese and also con- 
vinces them of their "right" to their 
superior position in society. 
On the other hand, detection of 
threats to the collectivity becomes a 
potent factor in cultural mobilization; 
anxieties andinsecurities dictate solidary 
responses. Crises engender acute anxie- 
ties and highly polarized perceptions. 
Not surprisingly, the Tamils denounce 
the established practice of Sinhalese na- 
tionalism and claim that this conflicts 
with the manner in which their members 
live or ought to live. They feel that society 
frustrates their aspirations and denies 
them the kind of life they feel is rightly 
theirs. 
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When cultural communities collec- 
tively perceive serious threats to 
communal status in the political 
environment, group solidarity tends to 
increase, as in the case of Tamils. Thus, 
counterstate of a nation of Tamils is 
created to prove their stake to the claim. 
They suggest collective course of action 
to allay their anxiety. 
The significance of the political myths 
is through their power to merge diverse 
perceptions and beliefs into a new and 
unified perspective that symbols affect 
what men want, what they do, and the 
identity they create for themselves 
(Edelman 1971, 6). Further, a political 
myth is always the myth of a particular 
mogeneous, highly potent or omnipo- 
tent group that conspires to harm the in- 
group, i.e., the Sinhalese. The actions are 
dictated by fear, signed by distrust or 
executed by emotions. Each group has a 
generalized perception of the other, 
clothed in insecurity and hostility, which 
swiftly imputes aggressive and threaten- 
ing intent and intense fervour in the re- 
sponse of the other to each stage of the 
unfolding crisis (Young 1976,161). 
A political myth tells the story of a 
political society; it is the story of a politi- 
cal society that was supposedly created 
in the past and that must now be restored 
or preserved. In reality, it concerns a po- 
liticalsoaety destined tobecreated in the 
In symbolic tmnsformah'ons such as those recounted earlier, 
the ethnicpohiution of the present is defined in terms of past 
rivalries, and, in that process, the past itself is rearranged in 
terms of the policies of the present. 
group. It has as its hero not an individual 
but a tribe, a race, a class, an ethnic group 
or collectivity, as in the case of Sri Lanka. 
Evocation of the cultural map of real- 
ity depends on the reception of social 
cues that prompt this response. Very of- 
ten, the cues are supplied by messages- 
communication face to face or through 
interpersonal media-which have al- 
ready processed reality through a cul- 
tural symbol system and transmit 
information in a communal structure 
(Young 1976, 143). Riots by Sinhalese 
thugs onTamils and their property, mak- 
ing Sinhala the national language in the 
"Sinhala only" policy, disenfranchise- 
ment of the Indian Tamils, the use of a 
Sinhalese cultural symbol on the national 
flag--all these actions have different 
meanings for the different communities. 
The Tamils feel that the status and ben- 
efits due them are being denied or threat- 
ened. It also evokes the feeling that the 
superordinate group, the Sinhalese, in 
this case, maintain and enjoy the privi- 
leges unfairly or unjustly. On the other 
hand, the Sinhalese majority registers 
these actions as the expected order of 
things. For them, the out-group, the 
Tamils are perceived as a different, ho- 
future and it is told for the purpose of 
encouraging men to hasten its advent. 
Today, both Tamil and Sinhalese strive 
to create two different nations; Sinhalese 
nationalism attempts to establish 
Sinhalese hegemony on the entire island 
and Tamil nationalism demands the 
creation of a separate state of Tamil 
Eelam in the northern and eastern part of 
the island. 
In symbolic transformations such as 
those recounted earlier, the ethnic polari- 
zation of the present is defined in terms 
of past rivalries, and, in that process, the 
past itself is rearranged in terms of the 
policies of the present. History/ myth is 
of the past but not in that past; it is rooted 
and flourishes in the present. 
Thus, political myths or metaphors 
create and filter value premises. These 
myths can be termed "political" because 
they serve as a means of establishing 
power relationships in society that are 
the basis of politics. The political myths 
highlight the benefits that flow from a 
course of action and erase its unfortunate 
concomitants, helping speakers and lis- 
teners to conceal disturbing implications 
from themselves. Ambiguous terms in a 
threatening context create a world in 
which p a w l ,  inconvenient facts are 
excluded, conveniently ignored and in 
which self-serving courses of action are 
justified. Because the myth is a means of 
succour against severe anxiety or vice 
versa, it is strongly embraced and de- 
fended, and in doing so becomes the 
mould into which perceptions of politi- 
cal developments are organized 
(Edelman 1971,74). Political leaders can 
thus rely on the ubiquity of anxiety and 
its extemalization in the mythsas an ever 
present base for a following. By the same 
token, anxiety readily converts even im- 
plicit and metaphorical references to 
mytluc themes into vivid and intensely 
held beliefs (Edelman 1971,80). 
The Role of the Elite in Cultural 
Symbolic Constructions 
Cultural symbolic constructions can be 
conceived as being deliberately built by 
social and institutional elites and more or 
less successfully imposed on members. 
As such, they are part of the exercise of 
power through which elites maintain the 
institutional order of society or ethnic 
community and their place in it. The 
symbolic universe is thus consciously 
created from "above" (Breton 1992,15). 
Interest groups like the elite exploit the 
symbolic forms to shape power relations 
in society. In this respect, the two orders, 
symbolic as manifestation of culture and 
political as relations of power between 
groups and/or individuals, are interde- 
pendent or to some extent causally re- 
lated and imply a competition between 
groups for resources and/or power. 
In the context of Sri Lanka, govem- 
ment leaders, politicians or even aca- 
demics compose the important 
constituencies of mythic acceptance, in- 
fuse their rhetorics with references toleg- 
ends. The legends of the religious 
chronicles Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa, 
their stories of ~rigin,amedstruggleand 
heroic resurgence, are woven into the 
fabric of Sinhalese religious and ritual 
life. The president of Sri Lanka, 
Ranasinghe Prernadasa [who was assas- 
sinated on May 1, 19931 was popular 
among the urban and rural poor. He pub- 
lished a short novel in Sinhala and in 
English that presents the heroic progress 
of Dutugamunu. The tone of the novel 
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aligned the president with widespread 
Sinhalese populist sentiment (Kapferer 
1988,42). 
Public eventsare often the occasion of 
ideological recharging by politicians at 
all levels within the government. At the 
opening of a small deity shrine in 
Panadura, a town just south of Colombo, 
Cyril Matthew, then the minister of in- 
dustries and scientific affairs, stated that 
"74 percent of the Sinhalese race should 
not be dominated by 12 percent of the 
minority community." At the same time, 
he announced that nationals in Sri kuzka, 
whatwer their community, had the right 
to live anywhere in Sri Lanka, and that 
"300 Buddhist temples had been 
excavated by the archaeological depart- 
ment in the north and in the east." These 
areas are dominated by the Tamil minor- 
ity. The program of the sedamation of 
temples was also announced on radio 
and television. Such statements are com- 
pletely consistent with Sinhalese claims 
to territorial hegemony that are sup- 
ported by a reading of the ancient chroni- 
cles. They are also consistent with 
schemes of Sinhalese cobnization and 
resettlement and with the practice of 
building replicas of ancient monuments, 
such as the Ruwaveliseya of 
Dutugamunu, around the island 
(Kapferer 1988,43). 
Similarly, academics have been no 
exception to the rule. A scholar from Sri 
Lanka claimed that Sri Lanka or 
Sinhaladip (Island of the Lion where the 
lion is a Sinhalese cultural symbol) is the 
land of the Sinhalese (People of the Lion) 
when she wrote: 
Sri Lanka was the land of the Sinhalese 
and ... nonSinhalese who resided 
there were allowed to do so by grace 
and favour of the Sinhalese "master 
race" who had prior rights of posses- 
sion and were the exclusive sons of the 
soil (Tennekoon 1990,216). 
Conclusion 
In Sri Lanka, both Sinhalese and Tamils 
are engaged in a modem battle fought 
with traditional slogans and/or weap- 
ons. Ethnicity and nationalism in this 
context are thus seen to be fundamen- 
tally, political phenomena as the sym- 
bols of the traditional culture are used to 
articulate political alignments and 
emerging ethnic cleavages. Cultural 
symbols, including history, lend signifi- 
cance to the collective violence of nation- 
alism in Sri Lanka. But, the "myths" 
being used to legitimize the rival nation- 
alism arebeingworked anew in the mod- 
em situation of ethnic conflict and relate 
to present political and social realities in 
Sri Lanka. 
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